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INTRODUCTION
Delphi has been involved with development and production of numerous vehicle systems that may be classified safety critical with respect to their operation on the vehicle. Technological advances associated with these systems may require corresponding advances in techniques to help verify safe operation of these systems. One such technological advancement is the inclusion of electronics to aid in the control and safety aspects of vehicles. Such systems as Throttleby-wire, Controlled Braking, Controlled Steering, and Supplemental Inflatable Restraint systems are commonly recognized as being integral to the safety aspects of the vehicle. These systems have advanced tremendously in their capabilities and application across a wide number of vehicles. As these types of systems continue to evolve, Delphi has been involved with helping to determine the proper methods and techniques for evaluating these systems and understanding the safety and reliability aspects at all levels of the design -be it within the whole system, a sub-system, or at a component level.
In the overall consideration of available techniques, the product teams need to understand the trade-offs between utilizing these techniques within their system hardware designs, and more and more commonly, within their software designs. With today's systems, a particular concern may be addressed by any of these design methods or by a combination of design methods. The software techniques and analysis methods described here do not represent an exhaustive list when compared to all techniques available within the broader embedded controls community, but they do represent sound methods that design teams may choose to utilize for their products.
ANALYSIS METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING NEEDED FAILSAFE TECHNIQUES
Software failsafe techniques are primarily developed to detect potential Electronic Control Unit (ECU) or peripheral hardware failures, thus enabling the system to initiate a transition to a safe state if any such potential failures occur. These techniques are important for safety-critical systems, because system developers must help verify that potential failures will not lead to any potential system hazards. There are many possible techniques to apply in helping to identify potential failures and needed failsafe techniques, but of these, fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) are the most commonly applied. In this section, we review these methods, as well as two others that we have found useful: preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) and fault coverage matrix.
A PHA is a high-level hazard analysis performed during the early stages of development to help identify the potential high-level hazards of the system, and to identify the potential risks of the high-level hazards. During PHA, the potential hazards are identified and described, potential worst-case mishap scenarios are determined, potential causes are identified, and the risk associated with the potential hazards and mishap scenarios is determined.
• Identify and evaluate potential failure modes of a product design and document their system effects • Determine actions or controls which eliminate or reduce the risk of the potential failure • Document the process.
FMEAs are widely used in the automotive industry where they have served as a general-purpose tool for enhancing reliability, trouble-shooting product and process issues, and analyzing potential hazards. For potential high-risk items, the design team identifies ways to eliminate or mitigate the potential hazards. The mitigating actions become safety requirements for the system and may be implemented in hardware, in software, or in both. The safety requirements identified by the PHA are typically high-level, and as a result, don't necessarily identify individual failsafe techniques. Instead, these high-level requirements often provide direction on identifying an overall ECU integrity strategy. The strategy may include specific ECU hardware features to support high integrity operation and an initial list of software failsafe techniques appropriate for the targeted ECU integrity strategy. This initial list of software failsafe techniques would be primarily based on past development experience with similar ECU integrity strategies.
Each of the potential failures or classes of failures identified by the FMEA is reviewed, and similar to FTA, appropriate hardware and software mitigation techniques are identified. Thus, a possible output of FMEA is a list of software failsafe techniques needed to mitigate those potential failure modes that may lead to potential system hazards.
Since FTA focuses on only those potential failures related to known potential hazards and FMEA considers all potential failures independently, it is probable that the FMEA will generate a larger set of potential failures to consider. However, the FTA may also contain potential failures or combinations of failures that are not identified by the FMEA process.
FTA is a deductive analysis method used to identify the specific causes of potential hazards, rather than to identify potential hazards. The top event in a fault tree is a previously identified potential system hazard, such as unwanted apply of the brakes. The goal of a FTA is to work downward from this top event to determine the potential credible ways in which the undesired top-level event could occur, given the system operating characteristics and environment. The fault tree is a graphical model of the parallel and sequential combinations of faults that could result in the occurrence of the top-level hazard. FTA uses Boolean logic (AND and OR gates) to depict these combinations of individual faults that can lead to the top-level potential hazard.
Another tool that may be used to determine necessary software failsafe techniques is a fault coverage matrix. The focus of this analysis is on determining the best set of controls (e.g., software failsafe techniques) to cover an identified set of failure classes (e.g., ECU hardware failure classes such as ALU miscalculations, and memory errors) such that adequate coverage is provided for each failure class.
The analysis can be performed using a spreadsheet similar to the one shown in Table 1 . FMEA is an inductive analysis method used to:
Known potential failures and associated risk levels are captured across the top of the spreadsheet. A list of known controls (e.g., failsafe methods) relevant to the potential failures is captured in the first column of the spreadsheet. The spreadsheet is filled out such that the coverage (e.g., High, Medium, Low, None) provided by each control for each of the potential failure classes is specified in the cells of the matrix. The controls that are currently selected for implementation are identified in the second column of the spreadsheet. The spreadsheet sums up the coverage level for each potential failure based on the coverage provided by each of the controls selected for implementation. The coverage metric depends on the potential risk associated with a potential hazard, such that high risk implies that higher coverage is required.
A significant advantage of a fault coverage matrix is that all failsafe techniques are considered at the same time, instead of individually, as is typically the case with FTA or FMEA. This global view helps verify that the best set of overall techniques is selected. Taken together, the PHA identifies the initial list of techniques, FTA and FMEA provide complementary detailed analysis to help verify that identified failsafe techniques cover all faults, and fault coverage matrix helps identify a final optimized set of failsafe techniques.
SOFTWARE FAILSAFE TECHNIQUES
This section provides information about different software failsafe techniques. For each technique a description, discussion of the major failures a given test will detect, and design limitations are given. In general, each of the techniques described may detect multiple types of failures. In some cases, the root cause of the failure may not be determined. However, detection of a failure is sufficient to trigger the appropriate failsafe action for the system. Eleven techniques are described in total. Table A1 , found in the appendix, provides a comprehensive summary of these methods.
COMPLEMENT DATA READ/WRITE Complement data read/write is useful for assuring the integrity of data being stored to memory (RAM). The data that is to be retained is stored as the actual value in one part of memory. The one's complement of the data is calculated and then stored in a separate part of memory. For example, if the data to be retained is 0xB136, then 0xB136 is stored in one part of memory, and 0x4EC9, the one's complement, is stored in a different part of memory. When the data is to be used, the two stored values are summed. If the summation is not zero, then a degradation in the memory has occurred.
Specific data storage errors that can be detected using this method include individual bits that are hard stuck to a value, and values that decay over time. Since this test is run prior to a value being used, even the long-term decay of values can be detected. The fast compare method detects failures in the ROM and EEPROM. Checksums are able to detect permanent errors in memory, such as flipped bits, and 3 other changes in values. Since the calculation of the checksum requires the use of the ALU, this method also provides some fault detection coverage for the ALU.
The largest limitation related to checksum tests is time. During runtime, the background test may be too slow to detect all errors in time to prevent a failure from leading to a potential hazard. Therefore, the code may be partitioned into safety-critical and non-safety-critical code, and the fast compare method may be used for the safety-critical code sections. This method helps confirm that a fault occurring in the safety-critical code is detected fast enough to prevent a failure from leading to a potential hazard. Since the tests performed during runtime are executed in a background task, there is typically not a large burden on the CPU resources.
REDUNDANT CODING
Redundant coding, or dual path software, is a methodology to store critical code in the program memory identically in 2 different memory areas. During runtime, both sets of code are run using the same inputs and the results are compared. The two results should be the same (or within some specified tolerance), so that a difference indicates an error. One method to improve redundant coding is to store the different pieces of code on separate pages of program memory. This way, if there is a failure on a particular page of memory, the failure will not manifest itself in the second copy of the code.
This technique can detect changes in memory (either ROM, RAM or EEPROM), and intermittent faults in the ALU, such as faults caused by EMI.
The largest limitation for redundant coding is it doubles the amount of code and processor time needed to implement a function. Another limitation is only transient or intermittent faults in the ALU can be detected.
REDUNDANT "ORTHOGONAL" CODING
Orthogonal coding is a process where safety-critical code is implemented two times using different processes or processor resources for each implementation. Orthogonal coding may be done using a different algorithm for the calculation, using the same hardware resources, or using a different algorithm and different hardware resources.
Since the orthogonal coding method relies on the use of different methods of calculations, the two results may not be exactly equal to each other. Therefore, when a comparison is done, a tolerance may be required to determine if the results match.
The major failures that can be detected by orthogonal coding are failures in memory or the ALU. Orthogonal coding may be effective at detecting a number of ALU failures depending on how it is implemented; for example, using different instructions of the ALU or using different hardware.
This orthogonal coding method may be memory intensive as it doubles the amount of memory required to implement a function. It may also double the amount of CPU time required. In addition, this method requires more development time since two different algorithms have to be created and maintained throughout development. Finally, the tolerances must be validated to help confirm that they are not too constrained, thereby leading to false positives, and that they are not too unconstrained, resulting in false negatives (i.e., no failures are identified, when a failure actually exists.) A strategy has been developed for use within brake control applications to perform fixed point multiply instructions in parallel both in the ALU and in the MAC for each usage of the multiply operation. The products from the MAC and ALU are compared and should always be equivalent. A detected error indicates an issue in one of the peripherals. The basic data flow of this strategy is shown in Figure 2 . The coverage of this strategy may be evaluated by identifying the number of multiplication operations used within an algorithm per execution loop. The MAC vs ALU compare will occur for each multiplication operation or macro that is executed. For a typical embedded controls fixed-point implementation, several types of multiplication macros may be used. A coverage matrix may be developed to identify which functions make use of certain multiply operations and how many multiplies are required per execution loop. Failsafe coverage is provided for the ALU during each usage of the MAC vs ALU compare. The redundant coding technique may be combined with other techniques to maximize the overall system failsafe coverage.
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PROGRAM FLOW MONITORING
Program flow monitoring (PFM) or process sequencing, is a technique to include a specific seed (initial key value) and key (final value/result) process within the program function to assure that the program execution has completed the major parts of the program, and that it has completed them in the correct order. Typically, the program being monitored will contain specific update points throughout the program flow. The update points are specific functions that operate on a parameter being supplied to them. This parameter may be referred to as the key value. At regular update points, or at the end of the program execution, the resultant key value is compared to the pre-calculated acceptable value. If a mismatch is discovered, then a program execution error has occurred. PFM may be implemented in two ways: application independent or application dependent.
The application independent method works by having a PFM update point between each function call. A consequence or side effect of this approach is that the point can be updated without the function having actually been called. However, this approach also provides greater flexibility and opportunity for re-use. For example, assume there are common functions A, B, C, and D across applications, and that for a particular application only functions A and D are needed. Using the application independent implementation allows the program flow monitoring code to be used without modification across both applications.
The application dependent implementation is more tightly integrated into the program execution. The actual PFM update points are coded within the functions themselves. This approach helps assure that all of the functions are called and that they are called in the correct order.
If specific functions need to be called within a certain window of time in relation to other functions, the application independent or application dependent methods of PFM may be enhanced to help verify the correct timing requirements. This enhanced method is known as time dependent PFM. This method helps confirm not only that the functions are called and that they are called in the correct order, but also that they are called within the required window of time. This task is accomplished by requiring the PFM update to occur at a specific time during the program execution. A flow chart showing the differences in the implementation is shown in Figure A1 of the appendix.
At each update point in the program execution, a function is executed to update the PFM variable. Various algorithms can be utilized for updating the key value. A simple version of an update function is: PFM_key=PFM_key+PFM_ID PFM_key=PFM_key*PFM_ID
• PFM_key is the value carried throughout the loop that becomes the key • PFM_ID is the ID of the update point. If there were four update points, then they would be numbered 1 to 4.
Therefore, as long as all of these updates or entry points, are run in the right order, the key will be correct. It is also beneficial to have multiple seed and key pairs so that the test cannot be passed merely because the key value is stuck at the correct value, or just never rewritten.
There are multiple ways to design PFM. One of these ways is with a single microprocessor design. The 5 microprocessor can check the value of the PFM key at the end of a loop. This is equivalent to having the microprocessor check itself, and thus, not all failures related to PFM will be detected. Another design strategy uses an asymmetric microprocessor. An illustration of PFM data flow for an asymmetric design is shown in Appendix Figure A2 . The monitoring microprocessor can query the main microprocessor every other loop for the PFM key. Since the monitoring microprocessor is an independent piece of hardware, it will be able to pick up most failures related to PFM. Another design strategy can be used if the controller is part of a distributed system. One of the other controllers in the system can take the place of the monitoring microprocessor in querying the main controller.
PFM can detect process errors such as the program skipping an important part of the program calculation. The extent to which program flow monitoring can detect errors is dependent on how many update points there are in the program and where the updates occur within the program (i.e., within the functions, or between function calls).
The biggest limitation for program flow monitoring is the amount of processor time consumed by the technique. If there are many PFM updates within a program performing a number of calculations, the amount of processor time PFM requires can be significant. Consequently, there is a trade-off inherent with PFM; the deeper the updates or thread depth, the better the detection ability of the method, but the more processor time is required.
Another design decision is which type of PFM to use. The benefit of an application independent approach is increased flexibility; the PFM code may be used over multiple applications. However, the coverage is limited and provides less confidence that a skipped function will be detected. Using an application dependent approach allows for better coverage and more confidence that a skipped function will be detected, but requires more maintenance as different applications may require a different set of functions to be used requiring all of the PFM routines to be reworked for each application. The time dependent approach used in conjunction with the application independent or application dependent methods helps assure that the program is flowing within the desired time frame, however, this method may not be feasible for applications with interrupts, since the interrupts may disrupt the timing.
RAM TESTS
RAM tests may be performed at initialization or during system runtime. A RAM initialization test is typically a set of tests to determine if the RAM of the microprocessor is functioning correctly before any application program tasks are started. On initialization, the RAM is tested to make sure that it can be written to and that it can hold a value for a short period of time. This is accomplished by writing a specific value or pattern to all RAM locations and then reading it back and comparing the read values to the written values. This operation is done twice using different values each time. Typically, the hex numbers 0xAA and 0x55 are used. These numbers are chosen so that all bits will have a '1' and then a '0' written to them. Other methods, such as "walking ones" method, where a single bit is systematically written and cleared are also commonly used.
There are two major failures of RAM that can be detected with this test: bits stuck as either a '1' or a '0', and decaying RAM cells. Some decaying faults may still pass depending on how long it takes the value to decay. RAM tests may also be performed during system runtime. This test method is similar to the test at initialization, where a specific pattern is written and read to RAM values. The runtime test must be designed as to not interfere with normal operation of the system since test values written to RAM, if read and used by the application during the test, could cause improper operation. This can be accomplished by performing the test during a background task or disabling other system resources while performing the test. The runtime test will take longer to check all RAM than the test at initialization. During runtime, RAM must be checked in small segments incrementally per application loop in order to minimize impact on system resources.
POWER UP/DOWN MEMORY WRITE TESTS
Power up/down memory write tests are used to determine if a controller has shut down properly. Information critical to the proper operation of the system may need to be stored in nonvolatile (NVM) or "keepalive" (KAM) memory between ignition cycles. Typically, this information is stored during the shutdown sequence of the controller.
During controller initialization, a specific data pattern is written to a NVM location (e.g. 0x55). During the shutdown sequence of a controller a different pattern is written to the same NVM location (e.g. 0xAA). A compare of the memory location is made at the next initialization sequence. If the data matches the data pattern written at the previous shutdown (e.g. 0xAA) then the test indicates that the controller had shutdown properly. A data read of the initialization pattern (e.g. 0x55) indicates that the controller had not gone through shutdown properly.
The power up/down sequence is effective in identifying when the controller has been abnormally reset or when system power is lost prior to completion of a shutdown sequence. Safety-critical processes or data may need to be reinitialized upon detecting an abnormal shutdown 6 sequence. The design of a power up/down memory sequence must be coordinated with the overall power moding and software task execution of the controller design. In addition, NVM or KAM hardware resources must be present in the hardware design.
COMPUTER OPERATING PROPERLY (COP) WATCHDOG TIMER
A watchdog timer is a device that helps assure that the microcontroller is operating properly. A watchdog timer may be internal or external to the system. It is a mechanism that begins to count down once it has been initiated. The device needs to be toggled / refreshed by software within a certain period of time to prevent a microcontroller reset. For an internal watchdog timer implementation, the counter and refresh circuitry are built into the microprocessor chip. For an external implementation, the counter and refresh circuitry are external to the microprocessor chip.
An external watchdog timer is typically built using an external RC circuit to perform the timing function. The external timer is toggled or refreshed via an output line from the microprocessor, and a reset is triggered via a reset input to the microprocessor in the event the timer function reaches the pre-set watchdog time.
TEST CASES
Test cases or test vectors are used to exercise the instructions of the ALU to detect ALU faults. Independent hardware is required to perform the test cases. Either an asymmetric processor or a secondary processor in a distributed system can be used to perform test cases.
The ALU operations are tested using an algorithm written to access all of the ALU instructions used in the main program.
This algorithm is called by the independent hardware using a seed and the output is compared to an output key. The seed is the initial starting value to be input into the test case calculation. There are multiple seed values. After all of the test calculations are completed, the output should be equal to the key that is appropriate for the given seed.
Watchdog timers are useful for detecting failures such as timing delays, infinite loops, and hung interrupts. Depending on the implementation (i.e., the toggle values or refresh mechanism), watchdog timers may also trigger a reset if the program skips certain steps; i.e., if the toggle values are sent out of order.
The algorithm can be split into multiple parts. Each part can be called at different times during a loop execution or the different parts may be called over multiple loops. Ideally the algorithm will cover all of the instructions of a microprocessor, but since the instruction set may be large (over 200 instructions for a Motorola HC12), including only those instructions used in the program is generally acceptable.
If a watchdog is to be used, a key decision is whether an external or internal watchdog should be selected. External watchdog timers are more robust than internal watchdog timers in that they can detect more failures. For example, an internal watchdog timer will not continue to function, and thus will not reset the microprocessor, in the event that the system clock malfunctions. This could happen if the power is reduced to a level that does not cause the micro to reset, but that causes it to cease to function properly. In this situation, an external watchdog would still trigger a reset of the micro. However, external watchdogs require additional hardware which must be designed to interface with the micro. Application and customer safety requirements, as well as other failsafe design methods must be considered in determining which type of watchdog timer is feasible.
There are two ways to implement test cases. One is to have a sequenced query, such that the order of the seeds is the same every time the program is run. Another method is to have a random query. In the random query, the monitoring unit has the ability to vary the order of the test cases.
The major types of ALU failures that can be detected using test cases include register failures and individual instruction failures.
The test case method requires independent hardware to perform the test cases, so it can only be used in a design that will have either a monitoring unit or multiple processors as in a distributed system. Since the majority of safety-critical automotive software is written in higher level languages such as C, C++, Modula, etc., it is useful to know which low-level instructions are used to implement the high-level instructions, so these instructions can be adequately tested. If the program changes and new instructions are utilized, then the test cases will need to be modified to include the new instructions.
COMPONENT/PERIPHERAL TESTS
Software techniques may be used to determine if a specific hardware peripheral or driver is operating properly. For example, a controller output may be driven during a specific initialization sequence and monitored for correct operation. Another example is the comparison of data from two redundant peripherals, where an invalid comparison within a magnitude and/or time tolerance will indicate a failure.
Component/peripheral tests are specific to a hardware design. Often, redundant components are needed for a sufficient failsafe strategy. The design strategy may use additional tests beyond a compare of two inputs to 7 isolate the exact component that is faulty. Synchronization and detection tolerance issues must be taken into account to help assure that the test is accurately identifying failed components.
REASONABLENESS TESTS
Reasonableness tests are methods in which a simplified model is developed for a control variable. The simplified model receives system inputs and determines an estimate of the expected output value. The actual value is compared to the expected value. If the two values differ by some pre-specified tolerance, then it is assumed that there is an error somewhere in the process. These tests are high-level process checks. They do not detect a specific fault, but rather detect a problem in a calculated output value. They detect that the actual value is out of range with respect to the expected or estimated value. In general, this method provides a sanity check of the overall process.
This method is application dependent; therefore the limitations of this method depend on the specific application.
EXAMPLE REFERENCE: DELPHI ELECTRIC BRAKE SYSTEM 3.0 DESIGN
This section illustrates the application of certain hazard analysis and software failsafe techniques as applied to the Delphi Electric Brake System 3.0 design. DELPHI ELECTRIC BRAKE 3.0 ARCHICTECTURE Appendix Figure A3 shows a system mechanization of the Delphi Electric Brake (DEB) 3.0 system. The DEB 3.0 system is a hybrid braking system that contains 2 electric calipers, one on each rear wheel of the vehicle, while the front brakes maintain a conventional hydraulic apply system. The electric calipers receive commands from the brake system controller via a CAN link. The system controller receives all the inputs to the system, and provides the controls for the front hydraulic modulator as well as the processing for all the higher order functions (Anti-Lock Braking, Traction Control, Electronic Stability Control, etc.). Figure A4 in the appendix shows a mechanization for the controller that is attached to the electric caliper. This controller receives commands from the system controller and provides the positioning of a brushless motor to actuate the rear brake. In addition to the control of the motor/actuator, a park brake mechanism is included in the brake that is controlled by the electric caliper controller. For design space and cost imperatives, each rear controller contains a single microcontroller. It was important during the design of this system that the safety implications of independent electronic control of each rear brake be managed appropriately.
DEB SYSTEM AND SOFTWARE ANALYSIS
Several of the system analysis methods discussed throughout this paper have been applied to the development phase of the DEB controller. Specifically Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) were used to identify potential hazards and causes of these potential hazards for the DEB system. A coverage matrix was developed to consider which software failsafe techniques would be appropriate to detect potential controller failures that have the possibility of leading to hazards. Table A2 in the appendix provides an example portion of the PHA. Failure to provide acceleration consistent with driver intent has been identified as a high level potential hazard within the DEB system. Several possible mishap scenarios are described which could result from the occurrence of this potential hazard. One item listed as a cause for such a potential hazard is that of controller failure.
To investigate effectiveness of strategies to detect possible controller failures a coverage matrix was developed. Potential severity and likelihood to occur were assessed for various types of potential controller failures such as memory failures, CPU failures, software processing errors, interface failures and communication failures. Proposed software failsafe techniques were considered for each controller failure category to determine if the coverage is strong (probable) or weak (less effective). Items identified as strong coverage would be considered as part of the failsafe software design. Table A3 shown in the appendix illustrates an abbreviated example of a portion of the coverage matrix.
FTA was used to identify causes of potential hazards of the rear electric brake system. A false apply of the DEB was analyzed to determine its possible causes. A DEB false apply was defined as too much caliper apply. The goal of this analysis is to work the graphical fault tree down to sufficient levels of detail that would identify undesirable causes for failures within the software design. Once these areas were identified, the appropriate software failsafe techniques were applied in order to diagnose these conditions and take the appropriate failsafe action.
A simplified example of a FTA diagram for the DEB 3.0 brake system is shown in Figure 3 . It should be noted that this could be expanded to several more levels of detail, however, a general example is shown here. Several causes are identified as factors that given a potential failure could lead to a DEB false apply. Items 8 represented by a transfer symbol (triangle) represent areas that may be further detailed on a separate page of the Fault Tree. Two areas identified as functional elements that could cause a false brake apply are improper behavior of the CAN transceiver and associated software, and improper behavior of the DEB controller software in its entirety. To mitigate the risk of these elements causing a false brake apply, Program Flow Monitoring and Reference Model Reasonable Tests are applied to the design. The following sections describe the tests that were applied to the DEB system.
PROGRAM FLOW MONITORING EXAMPLE
Given that DEB 3.0 is a distributed system, the PFM strategy for this application was to use the multiple controllers to crosscheck program flow. As the two rear controllers run the same software, the primary check is between these two controllers. Every other loop, a rear controller will query the other rear controller to request the key. A rolling seed is used, such that if the key received by the second controller is correct, the controller then sends the next seed. If the second controller thinks there is a problem, instead of shutting down both of the rear controllers, and thus shutting down the rear brakes, the controller will send back a message indicating that the key is wrong. At this time the system controller, which monitors all PFM communications, compares the key of the controller with what it believes the key should be. If the system controller does not agree with the key value, then the controller being tested will fail PFM and appropriate action will be taken. If the controller finds that the key is correct, the controller that initiated the query will fail PFM. The flow of events is summarized in Figure 4 . The algorithm for PFM implements test cases to integrate the two techniques. Prior to this application the only experience with program flow monitoring known within Delphi had been using an asymmetric design. Therefore, to work out the exact procedure of the program flow monitoring, a computer simulation was created. The simulation consisted of three computers connected over a CAN link with the CAN traffic being monitored. Each computer simulated a different controller in the system. The goal of the simulation was to develop the messages that were needed to implement PFM and make sure that the idea would work over a CAN bus. To make the program easier to work with, the algorithm implemented for this test was a simple addition and multiplication routine instead of a comprehensive test algorithm.
The simulation demonstrated that the process could detect bit errors as long as they occurred in the correct loop. Since the key is only checked every other loop, it is possible for bit errors, such as a stuck bit, to go undetected by this test. Permanent bit errors were detected during the testing. The simulation program was also able to demonstrate the capability of PFM to detect program execution out of its intended sequence. 9 CONCLUSION FORCE TO POSITION REFERENCE MODEL For DEB 3.0 system, the output position of the motor is the physical variable that is controlled. The desired position of the motor is based on the force command given by the system controller. The entire process entails the performance of numerous calculations, thus, there are many places for errors to occur. To provide broad coverage of the entire process, a reasonableness test was developed for the position output.
The development of advanced safety-critical automotive systems is driving the development of new tools and processes to help verify that these systems operate safely and that they are reliable and predictable. For these systems, product safety needs to be considered up front and addressed as part of the overall design process. This paper summarizes many of the available techniques to help analyze and implement a safe embedded system design. Based on our application experience, the analysis and failsafe techniques described here may be considered sound and beneficial. These techniques will continue to evolve as new technological challenges are recognized and addressed.
The reasonableness test is set up so the system controller takes its force command and uses a non-linear lookup table to find the desired position. Next it uses a set of second order transfer functions to estimate the actual output of the motor. The transfer functions are used to model the dynamics of the motor. The output of these transfer functions is then compared to the actual motor position sent by the rear controller.
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